Abstract. We consider one-round key exchange protocols secure in the standard model. The security analysis uses the powerful security model of Canetti and Krawczyk and a natural extension of it to the ID-based setting. It is shown how KEMs can be used in a generic way to obtain two different protocol designs with progressively stronger security guarantees. A detailed analysis of the performance of the protocols is included; surprisingly, when instantiated with specific KEM constructions, the resulting protocols are competitive with the best previous schemes that have proofs only in the random oracle model.
Introduction
There has been a recent rapid growth of interest in efficient cryptographic primitives of all kinds that carry proofs in the standard model. Avoiding the random oracle model (ROM) or generic group model is to be preferred, given the known problems with instantiating these models in practice [9, 12, 3] . However, the usual price to be paid for working in the standard model is a loss of efficiency.
This paper initiates the systematic study of key exchange protocols whose security can be analyzed in the standard model. Our focus here is on two-party, one-round protocolsprotocols in which only two message flows are required to securely establish a key between two parties. We provide two related, yet distinct, approaches to building such protocols using KEMs [1] , both in the ID-based setting and the traditional PKI-based setting. Our security proofs use the Canetti-Krawczyk model (appropriately adapted for the identitybased case), which is sufficiently powerful to allow the capture of a variety of security properties including basic session key security, key compromise impersonation resistance, and various types of forward security.
In the identity-based setting, there is no shortage of protocols with security analysis in the ROM, with Chen, Cheng and Smart [11] providing a useful survey and comparison of these. Our protocols appear to be the first explicit constructions that are proven secure in the standard model in this setting. A recent preprint [31] also considers ID-based key exchange in the standard model, but the security analysis therein is incomplete -we comment in more detail on this below.
We consider the instantiation of our ID-based protocol designs with a variety of suitable concrete KEM components. These are derived from ID-based KEMs of Kiltz [19] , KiltzGalindo [21] and Gentry [17] . By modifying these to operate in the setting of asymmetric pairings and ordinary elliptic curves, we are able to produce concrete ID-based protocols with security proven in the standard model that are only 2.5 times slower than the most efficient protocols with security established in the ROM, the comparison being made on elliptic curves with a 128-bit security level.
In the PKI setting we also obtain efficient, one round, concrete protocol designs in the standard model, which compare favorably with the protocols of Jeong, Katz and Lee [18] , Krawczyk [24] and Okamoto [29] which are to our knowledge the only one-round protocols secure in the standard model. The protocols are reasonably efficient even when compared to the best ROM protocols. For example, they can be instantiated with standard model KEMs to yield protocols with a computational increase of a factor around 3 when compared with HMQV [25] .
Our first protocol design is the most efficient of the two, and provides key-compromise impersonation (KCI) resistance but not forward secrecy (FS). The basic idea of our first protocol design is very simple: the two parties simply send each other a random secret value using the IB-KEM and then use a randomness extractor to derive a session key from the combined secrets. Our second protocol design is based on the first, but adds an independent Diffie-Hellman exchange to achieve forward secrecy. It also achieves KCI resistance.
In the rest of this introduction we give an overview of related work. We then establish some essential definitions, and go on to outline the Canetti-Krawczyk model in which our proofs are presented. Section 4 of the paper develops our two protocol designs and proves their security in the Canetti-Krawczyk model. Section 5 compares the efficiency and security of the new protocols with the (ROM) ID-based protocol of Boyd, Mao and Paterson [8] , one of the most efficient protocols in the identity-based literature. Section 6 compares the efficiency and security of the PKI-based version of the new protocols with the protocols of Jeong, Katz and Lee [18] , Krawczyk [24] and Okamoto [29].
Related Work
Following the development of practical schemes for identity-based encryption [30, 7] many other identity-based primitives have been designed; due to their practical importance, these have included many key exchange protocols. Chen et al. [11] have provided a useful survey and comparison of work to date on identity-based key exchange.
Initially all security proofs for identity-based primitives relied on the random oracle model. More recently there has been a focus on providing new identity-based encryption (IBE) and identity-based key encapsulation (IB-KEM) schemes with security proofs in the standard model. Recent and quite efficient proposals include those of Waters [32] , Kiltz [19] , Gentry [17] and Kiltz-Galindo [21, 22] .
Up until now, all proofs for identity-based key exchange protocols have continued to rely on the ROM, with the exception [31] noted. However, although Wang et al. [31] propose three protocols, a proof for only one is provided; the other two proofs supposedly use similar techniques. The protocol with a claimed proof applies a key derivation function H 2 to the shared secret, exchanged messages and identities. No properties of the key derivation function are stated or used in the proof; indeed the proof ignores the presence of H 2 altogether. However, without the key derivation function, the protocol is completely insecure, because it is based on the CPA (rather than CCA) version of Gentry's IB-KEM [17] and so has malleable messages. This malleability is easily exploited to find attacks which break the security of the protocol. The problems in the paper of Wang et al. [31] illustrate that it is not hard to devise ID-based protocols that look secure in the standard model but making the proofs work is not always so simple.
We note too that it is relatively straightforward to obtain standard-model secure key exchange protocols (in both settings) using the authenticator approach of Canetti-
Preliminaries
In this section we present standard definitions and results needed in the rest of the paper.
Definition 1 (Min-entropy [16, p.9] ). Let X be a probability distribution over A. The min-entropy of X is the value min-ent(X ) = min x∈A:
(Note that if X has min-entropy t then for all
Definition 2 (Strong randomness extractor [14, p.42] [28]). A family of efficiently computable hash functions H = {h κ : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} k |κ ∈ {0, 1} d } is called a strong (m, )-randomness extractor, if for any random variable X over {0, 1} n that has minentropy at least m, if κ is chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1} d and R is chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1} k , the two distributions κ, h κ (X) and κ, R have statistical distance , that is
To implement the randomness extraction function, one could apply the work of Dodis et al. [15] to use CBC-MAC, keyed cascade chaining, or HMAC as an almost universal hash function, and conclude that the function is a good randomness extraction function based on their extension of the leftover hash lemma.
Definition 3 (Pseudorandom Function Family (PRF)). Let F = {f s } s∈S be a family of functions for security parameter k ∈ N and with seed s ∈ S = S(k). Let C be an adversary that is given oracle access to either F s for s ∈ R K or a truly random function with the same domain and range as the functions in F. F is said to be pseudorandom if C's advantage in distinguishing whether it has access to a random member of F or a truly random function is negligible in k, for all polynomial-time adversaries C. That is,
is negligible in k.
Functions that are proven to be pseudorandom include CBC-MAC [5] (provided the underlying block cipher is a secure pseudorandom permutation family and the input length is constant) and HMAC [2] (provided the compression function is a PRF).
Assumption 1 (Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH)) Let F be a cyclic group of order p generated by an element f . Consider the set F 3 = F × F × F and the following two probability distributions over it:
and
We say the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) Assumption holds over F = f if the two distributions R F and DH F are indistinguishable by all polynomial-time adversaries D.
Definition 4 (ID-based KEM
). An IB-KEM E = (KeyGen, KeyDer,Enc, Dec) consists of four polynomial-time algorithms:
-(pk , α) ∈ R KeyGen(1 k ), given the security parameter k ∈ N, returns a master public key, pk , and master secret key α; -d id ∈ R KeyDer(pk , α, id ) generates a private key corresponding to the identity id .
-(C, K) ∈ R Enc(pk , id ) outputs a key K ∈ R K (the key space) and an encapsulation (ciphertext) C of the key under the identity id ; -K = Dec(d id , C) outputs key K corresponding to the encapsulation C.
Our definition of security for an identity-based key-encapsulation mechanism (IB-KEM) scheme is based upon that of Kiltz and Galindo [21] .
Definition 5 (IB-KEM-CCA Security). The security of an IB-KEM scheme E = (KeyGen, KeyDer, Enc, Dec) is defined using the following experiment.
where the oracles and advantage of A are defined as follows:
The advantage of A in the above experiment is:
E is secure against adaptively-chosen ciphertext attacks if Adv
(k) is a negligible function in k for all polynomial-time adversaries A.
Canetti-Krawczyk model
In this section the CK approach is reviewed. Further details of the model can be found in the original papers [4, 10] .
In the CK model a protocol π is modeled as a collection of n programs running at different parties, P 1 , . . . , P n . Each program is an interactive probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) machine. Each invocation of π within a party is defined as a session, and each party may have multiple sessions running concurrently. The communications network is controlled by an adversary A, also a PPT machine, which schedules and mediates all sessions between the parties. When first invoked within a party, a key exchange protocol π calls an initialization function that returns any information needed for the bootstrapping of the cryptographic authentication functions After this initialization stage, the party waits for activation. A may activate a party P i in two ways:
1. by means of an establish-session(P i , P j , s) request, where P j is another party with whom the key is to be established, and s is a session-id string which uniquely identifies a session between the participants. 2. by means of an incoming message m with a specified sender P j .
Upon activation, the parties perform some computations, update their internal state, and may output messages together with the identities of the intended receivers. Two sessions (P i , P j , s) and (P i , P j , s ) are said to be matching sessions if P i = P j , P j = P i , and s = s , i.e. if their session-ids are identical and they recognised each other as their respective communicating partner for the session. In the analysis of the protocols in this paper, we define the session-id as the concatenation of the messages sent and received by the party. In addition to the activation of parties, A can perform the following queries: 1. corrupt(P i ). With this query A learns the long term key of P i . 2. session-key(P i , P j , s). This query returns the session key (if any) accepted by P i during a given session s with P j . 3. session-state(P i , P j , s). This query returns all the internal state information of party P i associated to a particular session s with P j , but does not include the long term key P i . 4. session-expiration(P i , P j , s). This query is used for defining forward secrecy and erases from memory the session key on a completed session. The session is thereafter said to be expired. 5. test-session(P i , P j , s). To respond to this query, a random bit b is selected. If b = 1 then the session key is output. Otherwise, a random key is output chosen from the probability distribution of keys generated by the protocol. This query can only be issued to a session that has not been exposed. A session is exposed if the adversary performs any of the following actions: -a session-state or session-key query to this session or to the matching session, or -a corrupt query to either partner before the session expires at that partner.
Security is defined based on a game played by the adversary. In this game A interacts with the protocol. In a first phase of the game, A is allowed to activate sessions and perform corrupt, session-key, session-state and session-expiration queries as described above. The adversary then performs a test-session query to a party and session of its choice. The adversary is not allowed to expose the test session. A may then continue with its regular actions with the exception that no more test-session queries can be issued. Eventually, A outputs a bit b as its guess on whether the returned value to the test-session query was the session key or a random value, then halts. A wins the game if b = b . The definition of security follows. 1. If two uncorrupted parties complete matching sessions then they both output the same key; 2. The probability that A guesses correctly the bit b is no more than 1 2 plus a negligible function in the security parameter.
We define the advantage of A to be
Hence the second requirement will be met if the advantage of A is negligible. Canetti and Krawczyk also provide a definition of SK-security without PFS. The only difference with respect to the above definition is that now the adversary is not allowed to expire sessions.
Krawczyk [25] showed that forward secrecy in the usual sense cannot be achieved in a two-pass protocol such as the ones that we consider. Therefore we restrict our concern to what Krawczyk calls weak forward secrecy (WFS), in which the adversary is forbidden from taking an active part in the test session. We will also consider partial WFS, where we further restrict the adversary to corrupt at most one party to the test session. In the ID-based setting, WFS implies key escrow freeness, i.e. it protects against attacks in which the Key Generation Centre, who knows all the long term keys of all the parties, tries to (passively) eavesdrop in the communications of any two parties. The original CK model does not consider key compromise impersonation (KCI) attacks, where the adversary, after compromising the long-term key of a party A, engages in a successful protocol run with A posing as a third party B, i.e. A accepts a session key in the believe that it is shared with B, when in fact is shared with the adversary. Thus in a KCI attack there is no matching session to the test session. To model KCI resistance for our protocols we modify the definition of security to allow the adversary to corrupt the owner A of the test session (A, B, s).
Difference between the eCK and CK models
The essential difference between the eCK as defined in [26] and the CK model is that the eCK model substitutes the session-state query by a new ephemeral-key reveal query, which reveals the randomness used in the specified session. In addition, a new definition of freshness is formulated in the eCK model that permits ephemeral-key reveal queries on the test session. The important point to note is that the ephemeral-key does not include session state that has been computed using the long-term secret of the party. This is not the case in the CK model where, in principle, the adversary is allowed access to all the inputs (including the randomness, but excluding the long-term secret itself) and the results of all the computations done by a party as part of a session. In other words, there is information that is available to the adversary in the eCK model that is not available in the CK model, but the same is true in the opposite direction. Thus, strictly speaking, the security afforded by the two models cannot be compared.
Furthermore, it is arguable whether the differences between the two models are meaningful in reality. An attack where the adversary can obtain the randomness but not the rest of the session state seems rather special. In any case, we can generically defend against that type of attack by "pseudo-randomising" the random input using the long term secret, which is what protocols such as Okamoto's [29] and NAXOS [26] that have considered the eCK model do. That is, if r is the random input used by a session and s is the long term key of the party, the protocol first computes uses a pseudo-random function f to compute r = f s (r), and uses r instead of r. This way, even though r is available to the adversary through ephemeral-key reveal, r remains protected.
Generic 2×KEM Protocols
In this section, we present Protocols 1 and 2, two generic protocols based on the use of any CCA-secure IB-KEM. The first, Protocol 1, is the most efficient of the two, and provides KCI resistance, but does not provide forward secrecy. The basic idea of Protocol 1 is very simple: the two parties simply send each other a random secret value using the IB-KEM and then derive a session key from the combined secrets using a random extractor and expander. Protocol 2 adds an independent Diffie-Hellman exchange in a group generated by f to achieve (weak) forward secrecy. It also achieves KCI resistance. The description of both protocols for the PKI-based setting is the same except that the identities are substituted by the public keys of the parties.
The protocol messages and actions are symmetrical for the parties in our protocols. It is assumed that the IB-KEM is defined to output a random key if a ciphertext is not valid. Because the protocols complete in one round, the actual order in which the two parties A and B exchange their messages is irrelevant. In the descriptions provided we let A be the one party such that id A < id B , using some agreed order relation, e.g. lexicographic order.
Note that each party must check that the identity of the party in its incoming message is actually the identity of its intended partner. Furthermore, the decapsulated IB-KEM
Erase all state except (KB, s)
Protocol 2: Generic 2×KEM + Diffie-Hellman key must be securely erased in the same activation in which it is decapsulated. Thus we are making the restriction that session-state reveal queries do not return decapsulated keys. Note however that once the key is decapsulated it can be inmediately used to compute the session key, so there is no need to store decapsulated keys. This restriction is critical, otherwise the protocol can be trivially broken by the adversary, as follows. Let (A, C * A , B, C * B ) be the transcript of an observed protocol run that the adversary A seeks to compromise. A initiates a new session with B by sending D, C * A to B, i.e. A pretends to be D and replays the target ciphertext C * A . The adversary could then issue a session-state reveal for the new session to B, thus obtaining the decryption C * A . Using the same strategy with A, the adversary could find out the decryption of C * B , which would then allow the adversary to compute the session key corresponding to the session (A, C * A , B, C * B ). We emphasize that all other session state can be revealed as part of a session-state query, in particular, encapsulated keys (at the party that generated them) and DH exponentials.
Interestingly, Protocol 2 does not require that the parties check group membership of the Diffie-Hellman exponentials Y A and Y B . This is because the security of the protocol does not depend on them except for proving weak forward secrecy, where the adversary is passive, in which case these values are assumed to be correctly generated.
In the description of both protocols we have assumed that the same public parameters are used by both parties. This is however not necessary. Each party could be using different public parameters, IB-KEMs, or even one party could be using a IB-KEM and the other a PKI-based KEM.
We are now in a position to state the security theorems for the two protocols. For both these theorems we use the following notation:
is chosen uniformly at random from a strong (m, )-strong randomness extractor for appropriate m and (as described in Definition 2), -n orac is the total number of oracles (i.e. sessions) created by B against the protocol, and -1 p is the maximum probability that C 1 = C 2 where (C 1 , K 1 ) ∈ R Enc(pk , id ) and (C 2 , K 2 ) ∈ R Enc(pk , id ) for any identity (if C 1 = C 2 then K 1 = K 2 also since both ciphertexts decrypt to the same value). Theorem 1. Let B be any adversary against Protocol 1. Then the advantage of B against the SK-security (with partial WFS and KCI resistance) of Protocol 1 is:
Theorem 2. Let B be any adversary against Protocol 2. Then the advantage of B against the SK-security (with WFS and KCI resistance) of Protocol 2 is:
The proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 can be found in Appendix C. We remark that, despite the simplicity of the protocols, proving their security turns out to be less simple than one might expect.
On Alternative Session Key Derivation
When a particular KEM such as those of Kiltz [19] and Kiltz-Galindo [21] (shown in Appendix A) is used in conjunction with the protocol, it may be tempting to try to achieve forward secrecy by treating K A and K B as Diffie-Hellman values and deriving K A and K B by combining K A and K B in the usual Diffie-Hellman manner and then extracting the randomness from this combined key. However, such a modification invalidates the proof, since the adversary A against the KEM would no longer be able to generate the proper test session key when B, the adversary against the protocol, generates the input to the test session. The problem could be overcome by adding authentication to the messages, but this would increase the number of messages and rounds required by the protocol.
Similarly, when K A , K B and Y y A B are all elements of the same algebraic group, it may be tempting to set
, and changing K B similarly. This way, depending in the actual KEM used, it may be possible to optimize the computation of the product K A K B Y y A B , using multi-exponentiation algorithms [6] . Again, such a modification will invalidate the proof. Assuming the test session owner is A and the intended partner B, then the test session key returned to B would be Expd Exctκ(
However, if B uses the test session output C A as input to other sessions with B, B may learn values of the form α i , Expd Exctκ(K A α i ) (s i ) for many i (B can find out α i if it controls the the other party involved in the protocol run with B). Unfortunately, providing such values to B no longer fits with the definition of the randomness extractor, even if it is extended to allow multiple uses. To overcome this we need a different key derivation function. In particular we could use the key derivation function defined by Okamoto in his recent protocol [29] , which requires a pseudo-random function with pair-wise independent random sources. This is however a non-standard assumption, stronger than the pseudorandomenss of Definition 3. In any case, such key derivation function is only useful for some KEMs (when K A , K B and Y can be optimised).
Protocol Comparison: ID-based case
We now compare Protocols 1 and 2 with that of Boyd et al. [8] (BMP) which is one of the most efficient listed by Chen et al. in their survey of protocols [11, Table 6 ]. To compare the efficiency of the protocols we use the costs per operation provided by Chen et al. [11] for Type 3 pairings with a security parameter of 128, which are the most efficient type of pairings for security levels higher than 80 bits. The values are shown in Table 2 , which also shows the costs of Kiltz, Kiltz-Galindo and Gentry IB-KEMs. These figures require 256 bits to represent an element of G 1 , 512 bits to represent an element of G 2 , and 3072 bits to represent an element of G T . As suggested by Chen et al., we assume that all elements of the ciphertext are checked to determine that they lie in the correct subgroup to avoid attacks such as the small subgroup attack.
All of these IB-KEMs were originally proposed to use Type 1 pairings, and so to obtain the costs we have had to convert the three IB-KEMs to work with type 3 pairings. The modified schemes can be found in Appendix A together with a discussion on their security and efficiency.
In BMP each party sends only one element of G 1 to the other, so the bandwidth is smaller than using Kiltz's IB-KEMs with Protocol 1. Each party computes one pairing and two exponentiations in G 1 , as well as a subgroup check of one element in G 1 . Therefore the total cost per party is 23 time units, as opposed to the 56 units for the Kiltz IB-KEM with Protocol 1. This means that we have achieved identity based key exchange in the standard model in less than 2.5 times the cost in the random oracle model using the size of curve given above. Given the better security guarantees of the standard model, this extra cost may be considered quite reasonable. The efficiency of Protocol 2 will be worse than that of Protocol 1, but depending on the choice of the group f , it may not be much worse. For example, if the DDH assumption holds in G 1 (this will require G 1 = G 2 and no efficiently computable homomorphism from 
Protocol Comparison: PKI-based case
We now consider our two generic protocols in the traditional PKI-based setting and compare them with existing protocols. Table 3 shows the computational cost of Protocol 1 and 2 when instantiated with the recently proposed KEMs of Kiltz [20] and Okamoto [29] . The efficiency of these two KEMs is shown in Table 4 . The computational cost figures of both Table 3 and 4 include the cost of performing group membership tests (1 exponentiation per test) and distinguishes regular exponentiations from multi-exponentiations. However we ignore "half-exponentiations" that maybe possible when exponents are the outputs of hash functions. We stress that the shown computational costs are only rough indicative figures. The exact computational costs depend on actual choices of groups. We see that Kiltz's KEM is more efficient than Okamoto's by one regular exponentiation in the decapsulation algorithm. Kiltz's KEM security is based on the Gap Hashed Diffie-Hellman (GHDH) problem, while Okamoto's is based on the DDH problem and the existence of pseudo-random functions with pair-wise independent random sources (πPRF). Table 3 also shows the costs of the protocols due to Jeong et al . [18] and Okamoto [29], which to our knowledge are the only one-round protocols whose security has been proven in the standard model. HMQV [25] , whose security has only been shown in the random oracle model, is also included.
Jeong et al .'s protocol is the most efficient of all of the compared protocols, but does not provide KCI resistance. Protocol 1 instantiated with Kiltz's KEM results in the cheapest protocol with KCI resistance but only provide partial FS. Of the protocols providing both weak FS and KCI resistance in the standard model, Okamoto's protocol is the cheapest by one regular exponentiation. As discussed in Section 4.1, Okamoto's protocol can be seen as an instantiation of Protocol 2 with Okamoto's KEM but using a different key derivation function. We note that even Okamoto's protocol is slightly more efficient than Protocol 2 instantiated with currently most efficient KEM (Kiltz's KEM), Protocol 2 has the advantage of being generic. It is also possible that if a more efficient KEM is devised, then the generic Protocol 2 would be more efficient that Okamoto's. Note that Okamoto's key derivation function poses constraints on the KEM key space and hence cannot be applied generally to all KEMs.
Finally, we note that Protocol 2 is reasonably efficient when compared with HMQV. In its most optimised form (where there is no subgroup membership checking and considering short-exponents) HMQV requires around 2.2 exponentiations. We can roughly approximate 1 multi-exponentiation to 1.2 regular exponentiation [6] 
Conclusion
We have proven secure two generic protocols that may be used with any KEM to achieve secure key exchange in the standard model, in either the ID-based setting or the normal public key setting. In addition, we provided a detailed analysis of the protocols' efficiency on Type 3 curves; this necessitated the extension of the IB-KEMs of Kiltz [19] , Kiltz-Galindo [21] and Gentry [17] to use ordinary elliptic curves. We found that both our Protocols takes approximately 2.5 times as long as the protocol of Boyd, Mao, and Paterson [8] (which is only proven secure in the random oracle model) when both protocols are implemented on elliptic curves with a 128 bit security level.
The PKI-version of our protocols also compare favourably with the existing ones of Jeong et al . [18] 
A Evaluation of IB-KEMs
In this section, we evaluate the efficiency of the IB-KEMs of Kiltz [19], Gentry [17] and Kiltz-Galindo [21, 22] when implemented using asymmetric pairings. All of these IB-KEMs have been proposed and proven secure under the assumption that the scheme uses a bilinear map on a supersingular elliptic curve which provides a mapping from a pair in the same groupê :
Chen et al. [11] identify four different types of pairing, with the above case corresponding to Type 1, and note that although it is suitable for 80-bit security levels, its performance degrades significantly for higher security levels. Here we focus on Type 3 pairing systems, which are the most efficient for higher security levels. Type 2, 3 and 4 pairing systems all use a bilinear mapê :
We show how to transform each of the suggested IB-KEMs to use a Type 2 or 3 pairing system, and Appendix B shows how the modified schemes may still be proven secure in a similar fashion to the original ones. We point out that one of the main differences between Type 3 and Types 2 and 4 is that there is no efficiently computable homomorphism ψ from G 2 to G 1 in Type 3 pairing systems, and that instead of |G 2 | = |G 1 |, Type 4 pairing systems have |G 2 | = |G 1 | 2 , which does not appear desirable for the suggested schemes. Also, the existence (or not) of ψ affects the assumptions made in the proofs of security.
We use the following notation. For any i, G * i = G i − {1} where 1 is the neutral element. |G 1 | = |G 2 | = p for some prime p; g * is a generator of G 1 and g is a generator of G 2 . In the case of Type 2, g * = ψ(g).ê : 
∈ G 1 where id = (id 1 , . . . , id n ) ∈ {0, 1} n . HGen(G 1 , n) generates the hash key by choosing n + 1 random group elements h 0 , h 1 , . . . , h n ∈ R G 1 and returning them. TCR(·) is a target collision resistant hash function (see Definition ??). [17] . Gentry's IBE, has been modified so that the message of the IBE (chosen at random) is considered the key of the IB-KEM. We assume it requires an exponentiation in G T to generate this random message. Calculation of the key in the decryption algorithm has also been modified to reduce the number of pairings; this is possible since in the IB-KEM a random key is returned if the ciphertext is not consistent, and so checking for consistency can be incorporated into calculation of the key, as in the Kiltz-Galindo IB-KEMs.
The cost per operation shown in Figure 1 are from Chen et al. [11] for Type 3 curves with a security parameter of 128 to compare the cost of each IB-KEM on the same sized group (also shown in Table 2 . A security parameter of 128 bits requires 256 bits to represent an element of G 1 , 512 bits to represent an element of G 2 , and 3072 bits to represent an element of G T . The number of operations required by each scheme are similar to those in Kiltz's comparison of IBEs, with the exception of the inclusion in these figures of subgroup membership tests, a more efficient key derivation for Gentry's scheme, and a separate listing of exponentiations for each of the three groups. When two or more pairings are required to calculate a key, it is possible that the 20 units estimated per pairing is too high, since a significant portion of the pairing computation involves finding a unique representation of the output, and this would only be necessary once the different pairing outputs had been combined.
The fastest IB-KEM proposed so far is that of Kiltz, followed closely by that of Gentry. Kiltz's scheme uses a slightly non-standard assumption, namely the mBDDH (modified bilinear decisional Diffie-Hellman) assumption. The assumption may be modified to allow G 1 = G 2 when ψ is not efficiently computable and stated as follows. Given
, it is hard to distinguish whether W =ê(g * , g) abc or not. The Kiltz-Galindo scheme is based on the standard BDDH assumption: given (g * , g a * , g b * , g c * , g, g b , g c , W ), it is hard to distinguish whether W =ê(g * , g) abc or not. (When G 1 = G 2 , ψ is efficiently computable, or a gap assumption is used in the proof, the powers of g * may be omitted in both assumptions, provided every power of g * is given as a power of g instead.) Gentry's scheme is based on a very non-standard assumption, the truncated decision q-ABDHE (augmented bilinear Diffie-Hellman exponent) assumption, whose hardness in relation to the BDDH assumption is unknown. The assumption (modified for the case when G 1 = G 2 ) states: given (g * , g
it is hard to distinguish whether W =ê g * , g (α q+1 ) or not. However, by using this assumption, Gentry is able to achieve a tight reduction, whereas the other two schemes do not, losing a factor of about (n + 1)q where q is the upper bound of the number of key derivation/decryption queries in the KEM. One drawback of the Kiltz and Kiltz-Galindo schemes is the use of the Waters hash, H. If we assume that identities are 30 bits long, this contributes 31 elements of G 1 to the system parameters, or 7, 936 bits using the above figures. If this figure is seen to be too large, Gentry's scheme may appear more attractive. However, it requires the use of a universal hash function, which if implemented using the well-known method of multiplying a Toeplitz matrix (one with constant diagonals) by the input to create the output [27], would require a key of 6, 655 bits (256 + 3072 + 3072 bits input plus 256 bits output minus 1). Although this may be an improvement on the storage requirements for H, it is not a huge one. Unfortunately, it is unclear exactly what effect the universal hash function has in Gentry's proof. In particular, it would be nice to know whether the universal hash function may be replaced with an almost universal one, and how close to universal that function must be. If this were the case, it may be possible to apply the work of Dodis et al. [15] to use CBC-MAC, keyed cascade chaining, or HMAC instead of the universal hash function, and so reduce the size of Gentry's system parameters substantially.
On the other hand, it is possible to make a tradeoff between the size of the Waters hash and the security of the IB-KEM scheme (see e.g. Kiltz [19] for details). The tradeoff chooses a parameter l and considers each identity a sequence of l-bit strings. Then, for identities n bits long, only (l/n + 1) h i need to be chosen to define the hash function H, and each h i is raised to the i th l-bit string in the identity to find the hash of an identity. A multiplicative factor of 2 l must then be added to the security reduction of the IB-KEM scheme.
B Extension of Proofs to Ordinary Curves
Given the modified assumptions provided in Appendix A for the three IB-KEM schemes, it is not hard to modify the proofs to accommodate the modified IBKEMs. Each value or calculation defined in the proof must be examined to see whether it should be in G 1 , G 2 or G T . This is fairly straightforward given the descriptions of the modified schemes. Then, wherever necessary, any value g x for any x should be replaced with g x * to put the value or calculation in the correct group. The only exceptions to this rule are the calculations of the value K in Game 7 of Kiltz's proof and Game 8 in Kiltz and Galindo's proof. As originally written, these calculations would require the division of elements from two different groups. However, the calculations can be modified to avoid this problem but provide the same answer. In the Kiltz proof, the calculation must be changed to be:
e g a * , c
and in the Kiltz-Galindo proof, the calculation must be changed to be:
C Security proofs
C.1 Analysis Techniques
In each proof, we wish to show that each game cannot be distinguished from the previous one, without breaking a hard problem. More precisely, we wish to show that in each game, the probability that B outputs 0 when b = 0 is (almost) the same as in the previous game and the probability that B outputs 0 when b = 1 is (almost) the same as in the previous game. Then, in the final game, we wish to show that from the point of view of B, the output of the test session is independent of all other values in B's view. Therefore, in the last game, B has no advantage in distinguishing whether b = 0 or b = 1. Since it will be shown that each game cannot be distinguished from a previous one, this means that in Game 0 B cannot tell the difference between b = 0 and b = 1 either. This is exactly what is necessary to show that the protocol is secure. We use the following notation.
σ i = The event that B guesses the value of b correctly in Game i (6)
We observe that if Games i and i + 1 are identical when event E does not occur, and if there is a probability of 1 2 that B is correct in Game i + 1 when E does occur, then:
We also use the following game hopping technique suggested by Dent [13] . Consider an event E that may occur during B's execution such that E is detectable by the simulator, E is independent of σ i , Game i and Game i+1 are identical unless E occurs, and Pr[σ i+1 |E] = 1 2 . Then we have:
C.2 Proof of Theorem 1
We now proceed to prove Theorem 1. The proof has two parts; the first part proves the security of Protocol 1 when the partner to test session is not corrupted. The second part proves the security of Protocol 1 when the partner to the test session is corrupted (in this case, we require the test session to have a matching session by the time B finishes).
Remember that we are only considering partial forward secrecy, and therefore B does not corrupt both the owner of the test session and the corresponding partner. Throughout the proof, we call each session to be activated at party an oracle. We denote the oracles with which B interacts Π i X where X is the name of a party and i is the number of the oracle. We number the oracles such that Π i X is the i th oracle created by B out of all oracles created by B (i.e. if Π i X and Π j Y are two oracles, then i = j implies X = Y ). Also, for any party, X, the identity of that party is denoted e X . We consider the following series of games with B.
Case 1: Partner to the test-session is not corrupted In this case, the partner to the test session is not corrupted, but the owner of the test session may be, either prior to the session (as in a KCI attack), or after the session expires (as in a forward secrecy attack). This part of the proof uses the following series of games with B.
Game 0. This game is the same as a real interaction with the protocol. A random bit b is chosen, and when b = 0, the real key is returned in answer to the test session query, otherwise a random key from U 2 is returned. Game 1. This game is the same as the previous one, except that if two different sessions output exactly the same message and have the same intended partner, the protocol halts. Game 2. This game is the same as the previous one, except that before the adversary begins, a random value m ∈ R {1, 2, . . . , n orac } is chosen. We call the m th oracle to be activated the target oracle. If the target oracle is not the test oracle, the protocol halts and B fails and outputs a random bit. We denote the input message to the target oracle with C, the corresponding output message with C * , the target oracle's owner with T and the target oracle's intended partner with T * . Note that there may not be a matching test session activated at T * . Game 3. In this game, a random value K * is chosen. Whenever C * is used as input to an oracle owned by T * , the calculation of the key is modified so that K * is used in place of Dec(pk , d T * , C * ); the message output by this oracle is calculated as usual. Similarly, K * is used instead of K T in the calculation of the session key by T . The rest of the Game 3 is the same as Game 2. if b = 1, a random key from U 2 is returned. Otherwise, K * is used in the computation of the test session as described above. Game 4. This game is the same as the previous one, except that a random value K * ∈ R U 1 is chosen and the use of Exct κ (K * ) is replaced with K * . Game 5. This game is the same as the previous one, except that whenever the value Expd K * (s ) for any s would be used in generating keys, a random value from U 2 is used instead (the same random value is used for the same value of s ; a different random value is chosen for different s ).
Analysis of Games 0 to 2: Let p sameMsg be the probability of two or more sessions outputting the same message. We have
Then, from (11)
This can be used to bound τ 0 as follows:
In Game 2, the probability of the protocol halting due to an incorrect choice of m is 1 − 1 norac . Whether or not an abortion would occur in this game could be detected in the previous game if it also chose m in the same way. Therefore, we may use equation (17) to find:
and (20) gives
Analysis of Game 3: We now construct adversary A against the security of the IB-KEM, using B. A is constructed such that when it receives the real key for the IB-KEM scheme, the view of B is the same as in Game 2, but if A receives a random IB-KEM key, the view of B is the same as in Game 3. Then, by the security of the IB-KEM scheme, we can claim these games are indistinguishable.
To begin, A is given the master public key pk . A passes this value as well as the description of Exct κ (·), its key κ and {Expd K (·)} K∈U 1 to B. Recall that A has access to the corresponding oracles O KeyDer (·) and O Dec (·, ·).
A runs as described in Game 2, except that when the target session is activated, A outputs e T * as the identity on which it wants to be tested. A receives a ciphertext C * for T * and key K * , which may be the decryption of C * or may be a random IB-KEM key, each with equal probability. A then uses C * as the output of the target session, modifies the calculation of keys so that K * is used in place of Dec(pk , KeyDer(pk , α, e T * ), C * ), and uses K * instead of K T to find the answer to the test session query when b = 0.
All legitimate queries made by B can still be answered by A using its oracles in as follows.
-A corrupt query on some identity e X may be answered with O KeyDer (e X )(recall that no corrupt query is made by B on the partner to the test session, T ). -A must maintain the session state of each oracle so that it may be returned in answer to session state reveal queries (session state reveal is not allowed on the test session or its matching session). -Any message C X to any party (including T * ) with identity e X may be decrypted using O Dec (e X , C X ) to generate keys for reveal session key queries and the test query.
When B halts and outputs its bit b , A halts and outputs 1 − b . The probability that A is correct is Pr[σ 2 ] when K * is the real key for the IB-KEM message, and 1 − Pr[σ 3 ] when K * is not the key for the IB-KEM message. We can then find that:
Analysis of Game 4 We now consider an adversary, D, against the security of the randomness extraction function. This adversary runs a copy of B and interacts with B in such a manner that it is the same as when B interacts with either Game 3 or 4. D receives a key κ for the randomness extraction function and a value R 1 such that either R 1 = Exct κ (X) for some X ∈ R K or R 1 ∈ R U 1 . D sets κ to be the public parameter used to key the randomness extraction function, and chooses the other public parameters according to the protocol. D runs as described for Game 4, except that D uses R 1 in place of K * . When B outputs it guess of the bit b, D outputs that R 1 = Exct κ (X) for some X if B is correct, and D outputs that R 1 ∈ R U 1 otherwise. The probability that D is correct is
. By the security of the randomness extraction function, we have:
Analysis of Game 5 Now, we consider another adversary, D , this time against the randomness expansion (or pseudorandom) function family {Expd K (·)} K∈U 1 . We define D to run a copy of B, and to interact with B in such a manner that it is the same as when B interacts with with either Game 4 or 5. D receives the definition of the function family {Expd K (·)} K∈U 1 , and an oracle O(·) which is either Expd K (·) for some value of K unknown to D or a truly random function. D runs a copy of the protocol for B in the same way as described for Game 4, except that whenever the value Expd K * (s ) for any s would be used in generating keys, D uses the value O(s ) instead. When B outputs it guess of the bit b, D outputs that its oracle is a member of the given function family if B is correct, and D outputs that its oracle is a truly random function otherwise. The probability that D is correct is
. By the security of the randomness expansion function we have:
In Game 5, let us denote the key returned in the test session query with R 1 ⊕ Expd K T * (s ) when b = 0, and R 2 when b = 1, where R 1 and R 2 are chosen uniformly at random from U 2 . Now, R 2 is chosen independently of all other values in the protocol, so B can gain no information about R 2 directly; B can only gain information about R 2 by determining whether b = 0 or b = 1. Furthermore, when b = 0, unless B can gain some information about R 1 , the response to the test session query also looks random and is therefore indistinguishable from the case when b = 1.
To gain information about R 1 from a source other than the test session query response, B must obtain the key of a session that has also used R 1 in the generation of its key. Now, if R 1 is used in the generation of a session's key, then that session must have had the same session identifier, and hence exchanged the same messages as the test session. Therefore, the session is either owned by T * with intended partner T and received C * as part of its input or is owned by T with intended partner T * and had C * as part of its output. However, such a session owned by T * will match the test session and so not be subject to reveal key queries.Hence, B can gain no information about R 1 , and so B can gain no information about b in Game 5, and therefore
Combining the results in equations (22), (26), (30) and (34) we conclude:
Case 2: Partner to the test session is corrupted Recall that we only consider partial weak forward secrecy for Protocol 1. Consequently we require that 1. the owner of the test session be not corrupted by the adversary, 2. the adversary be passive in the protocol corresponding to the test session; that is there exists a matching session to the test session at the intended partner by the time that the test session query is issued by the adversary; and 3. the partner to the test session be corrupted only after the matching session expires.
For this part of the proof we set up the following series of 6 games with B. Game 0 and 1 are the same as in Case 1. Game 2 and 3 are analogous to Game 2 and 3 in Case 1 except that now our target oracle is the partner to the test session, and it is its input to the session key that is substituted by a random value. Game 4 and 5, which are used to prove the security of the session key derivation mechanism via randomness extraction and expansion also remain essentially the same.
Game 0. This game is the same as a real interaction with the protocol. A random bit b is chosen, and when b = 0, the real key is returned in answer to the test session query, otherwise a random key from U 2 is returned. Game 1. This game is the same as the previous one, except that if two different sessions output exactly the same message and have the same intended partner, the protocol halts. Game 2. This game is the same as the previous one, except that before the adversary begins, a random value m ∈ R {1, 2, . . . , n orac } is chosen. We call the m th oracle to be activated the target oracle. If the target oracle is not the partner to the test oracle, the protocol halts and B fails and outputs a random bit. We denote the input message to the target oracle with C * , the corresponding output message with C, the target oracle's owner with T * and the target oracle's intended partner with T . Game 3. In this game, a random value K ∈ R K is chosen. Further a bit c ∈ R {0, 1} is chosen as a guess as to whether B corrupts T or T * . Whenever C is used as input to an oracle owned by T , the calculation of the key is modified so that K is used in place of Dec(pk , d T , C); the message output by this oracle is calculated as usual. Similarly, K is used instead of K T in the calculation of the session key by T * . The rest of the Game 3 is the same as Game 2. if b = 1, a random key from U 2 is returned. Otherwise, K is used in the computation of the test session as described above. Game 4. This game is the same as the previous one, except that a random value K ∈ R U 1 is chosen and the use of Exct κ (K ) is replaced with K . Game 5. This game is the same as the previous one, except that whenever the value Expd K (s ) for any s would be used in generating keys, a random value from U 2 is used instead (the same random value is used for the same value of s ; a different random value is chosen for different s ).
In the analysis that follows, we denote with σ i the event that the adversary is successful in Game i and with τ i the corresponding advantage.
Analysis of Games 0 to 2:
This analysis is the same as the that of Games 0 to 2 in Case 1. Thus,
Analysis of Game 3: This analysis is very similar to that of Game 3 in Case 1. We construct adversary A against the security of the IB-KEM, using B. A is given the master public key pk and passes this value as well as the description of Exct κ (·), its key κ and {Expd K (·)} K∈U 1 to B. A runs as described in Game 2, except that when the target oracle is activated, A outputs e T as the identity on which it wants to be tested. A receives a ciphertext C for T and key K , which may be the decryption of C or may be a random IB-KEM key, each with equal probability. A then uses C as the output of the target oracle (and hence input to the test session). A modifies the calculation of keys so that K is used in place of Dec(pk , KeyDer(pk , α, e T ), C), and uses K instead of K T to find the answer to the test session query when b = 0. All legitimate queries made by B can still be answered by A using its oracles as follows.
-A corrupt query on some identity e X may be answered with O KeyDer (e X )(recall that no corrupt query is made by B on the owner of the test session, T ). -A must maintain the session state of each oracle so that it may be returned in answer to session state reveal queries (session state reveal is not allowed on the test session or its matching session). -Any message C X to any party (including T ) with identity e X may be decrypted using O Dec (e X , C X ) to generate keys for reveal session key queries and the test query.
When B halts and outputs its bit b , A halts and outputs 1 − b . As in Case 1, the probability that A is correct is Pr[σ 2 ] when K is the real key for the IB-KEM message, and 1 − Pr[σ 3 ] when K is not the key for the IB-KEM message. Hence,
Analysis of Game 4 This is the same as in Case 1. Thus,
Analysis of Game 5 This is the same as in Case 1. Thus,
Combining Results Again using the same reasoning as in Case 1, we conclude that τ 5 = 0, and therefore combining equations (36), (37), (38) and (39) we have: 
This is the same advantage as in Case 1 and hence Therorem 1 follows.
C.3 Proof of Theorem 2:
The security difference between Protocol 1 and 2 is that the latter provides full WFS, i.e. in addition to the adversarial capabilities considered in the proof of Theorem 1, we now allow the adversary to corrupt both parties to the test session. It is natural then two consider the proof of Theorem 2 in two parts: the first part where the adversary does not corrupt both parties to the test session, and the second part where it does. Then, the first part is essentially identical to the proof of Theorem 1. The only difference is that in the analysis of Game 3 (in both Case 1 and 2) A needs to simulate the extra Diffie-Hellman values, which A can easily do for all sessions, including the test session.
We deal now with the second part of the proof, where the adversary corrupts the two partners to the test session. Note however that the adversary is restricted to being passive during the protocol run corresponding to the test session -a consequent of only being able to achieve weak forward secrecy in one round. As we will see below this allows us to inject a challenge Decisional Diffie-Hellman triplet into the test session.
The second part of the proof allows any party to be corrupted. It considers the following two games with B.
Game 0. This game is the same as a real interaction with the protocol. A random bit b is chosen, and when b = 0, the real key is returned in answer to the test session query, otherwise a random key from K is returned. Game 1. This game is the same as the previous one, except that before the adversary begins, random values j, j * ∈ R {1, 2, . . . , n orac } are chosen. Let T and T * be the owners of the j th and j * th sessions respectively. if the j th session at T is not the test session or if the output of the j * th session at T * is not used as input to the test session, then the protocol halts and B fails and outputs a random bit. Furthermore, the session key of the test session is set to a random value from K, the keyspace of the KEM. The test session's matching session has its key is set to the same random value (i.e. a random test session key is always returned, no matter what the value of b).
We now construct adversary A against the DDH problem, using B. A is constructed such that provided A does not have to abort the protocol as specified in Game 1 then if A's input is from DH F , the view of B is the same as in Game 0, but if A's input is from R F , the view of B is the same as in Game 1. Then, by Assumption 1, we can claim these games are indistinguishable.
To begin, A generates all the protocol parameters and passes the public parameters to B.
Let (f a , f b , h) be A challenge DDH inputs (with h either f c or f ab ) When the j th and the j * th sessions are activated, A uses its inputs f a and f b instead of the values Y T and Y T * when it generates the outputs of these sessions. Apart from this change, all session inputs and outputs are generated according to the protocol specification.
When the test session query is made, A uses Exct κ (h) in place of K T T * when calculating the real test session key.
A is able to answer all other queries correctly since it knows all of the system parameters and all of the session states.
The probability that A will not have to abort the protocol as described in Game 1 is 1 n 2 orac . Furthermore, in Game 1, B is able to gain no advantage since a random key is always returned in answer to the test session. Hence, by (17) and using a similar logic to that shown in (31) to (34) we have that: 
